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IGNIFICANT activity occurred in the area of commercial transac-
tions during the last survey period on both the legislative and judi-
cial fronts. Of particular importance is the legislative adoption of
the 1978 Official Text of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code deal-
ing with investment securities.' This Article discusses this development, as
well as others of a less comprehensive nature. The survey subjects are
treated in the same order as the subject matters appear in the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Legislative Changes
Definitional Amendments. Section 1.201 of the Code contains definitions
that are applicable to the entire Code.2 The revision of chapter 8 creates
two main types of investment securities, the certificated security3 and the
uncertificated security.4 While both types of securities have technical defi-
nitions, the primary distinction between them is that a certificated security
is represented by an instrument that can be physically transferred from
hand to hand, while transfer of an uncertificated security is represented
only by entry on the books of the issuing corporation.5 The distinction is
similar to the distinction between a certificate of title to a motor vehicle
that is signed over to a buyer at the time of sale, thereby immediately evi-
dencing the sale and protecting the buyer against third parties, and the
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University.
1. The new article 8 was adopted by Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 442, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws
2511-83 (codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.101-.408 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1984)).
The Uniform Commercial Code first became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966. Uniform
Commercial Code, ch. 721, §§ 1-101 to 10-105, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1-316. In 1967 it
became part of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Act of Sept. 1, 1967, ch. 785, §§ I-
6, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343-2782. As amended, the Texas version of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code now conforms closely to the 1978 Official Text. In this Article all references
are to the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in chapters I through 11 of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code), TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1984).
2. Id. § 1.201 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1984).
3. Id. § 8.102(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
4. Id § 8.102(a)(2). Compare id. § 8.102(a)(2) (definition of uncertified security) with
id. § 8.102(a)(3) (distinctions between certified and uncertified security).
5. Id. §§ 8.102(a)(2)-(3).
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delivery of a deed to real property to a buyer that must be recorded before
various third-party claims can be defeated. Because the bulk of stock
transactions take place through brokers and stock exchanges, uncertifi-
cated securities will facilitate the exchange process by eliminating the need
for physical transfer of stock certificates through several hands whenever
shares are bought or sold. Section 1.201 contains several conforming
amendments that reflect the revision of chapter 8 by adding the word "cer-
tificated" to those definitions dealing with the holding or transferring of
securities.6 The uncertificated security is defined only in the new chapter
8.7 Section 1.201 needed no conforming amendments to reflect this new
type of security.
Besides these conforming amendments, the legislature modified the defi-
nition of bank in section 1.201.8 This modification leaves no doubt that
the rules of chapters 3 and 4 of the Code dealing with commercial paper,
bank deposits, and bank collections9 cover savings and loan associations,
credit unions, and other institutions that offer checking account services.' 0
The federal adoption of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 prompted this change."
B. Choice of Law
Choice of Law by Agreement. In Mostek Corp. v. Chemetron Corp. 12 the
parties to a sales contract specified that Illinois law governed the interpre-
tation and performance of their agreement. In a suit alleging negligence,
breach of warranty, and strict liability in tort, the court held that the state
of Illinois bore a reasonable relation to the transaction and that the choice
of Illinois law by agreement of the parties was valid.' 3 Applying Illinois
law, the court found that the seller effectively disclaimed liability for negli-
gence and breach of warranty, but that Illinois disallowed disclaimer of
strict liability in tort.' 4 The court remanded the case for trial on the strict
liability issue.' 5 The Mostek decision joins a growing list of cases uphold-
ing a consensual choice of law provision under the reasonable relation test
of section 1.105.16
6. Id. §§ 1.201(5) (bearer), 1.201(14) (delivery), 1.201(20) (holder).
7. Id. § 8.102(a)(3).
8. Id. § 1.201(4).
9. Chapter 3 of the Code, id §§ 3.101-.805 (Vernon 1968), is entitled "Commercial
Paper." Chapter 4, id §§ 4.101-.504, is entitled "Bank Deposits and Collections."
10. Id. § 1.201(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
11. Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 101-902, 94 Stat. 132-93 (1980) (codified at scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. (1982)).
12. 642 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
13. Id at 24.
14. Id. at 26.
15. Id. at 27.
16. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see, e.g., First
Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land Co., 617 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Walker v. Associates Fin. Servs. Corp., 588 S.W.2d 416
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Hi Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing Trust v.




A typical acceleration clause permits a creditor to accelerate the entire
remaining balance of an installment obligation upon the occurrence of a
particular event or whenever the creditor deems himself insecure. 17 One
fact situation that arises with some frequency in acceleration cases involves
a debtor who has made several late installment payments and a creditor
who has accepted the payments despite their lateness. When the creditor
finally tires of receiving late payments and tries to accelerate, the debtor
argues that the creditor has waived acceleration rights by the prior accept-
ance of late payments.
During the survey period debtors successfully raised the waiver argu-
ment in three cases,' 8 and only in Slivka v. Swiss A venue Bank '9 was the
creditor able to avoid the defense. In Slivka the creditor notified the
debtor, both orally and in writing, that further late payments would not be
acceptable. When the debtor's next payment was late, the creditor's attor-
ney gave prompt notice of acceleration. The court, in reaching its decision
that the right of acceleration had not been waived, quoted and applied the
following rule from the earlier case of McGowan v. Pasol:20
[W]here, as is the case here, the holder of the note has accepted late
payments on numerous occasions in the past, he is precluded from
accelerating the maturity of an installment note because of a single
late payment unless he has, prior to the late payment for which de-
fault is claimed, notified the maker that in the future he will not ac-
cept late payments. 2'
The lesson of Slivka is clear. If a creditor intends to accelerate after hav-
ing previously accepted late payments, he must notify the debtor that no
further late payments will be acceptable. A failure to give such notice will
likely result in a waiver of the right to accelerate.
II. SALES TRANSACTIONS
A. Scope of Chapter 2
Insurance Coveragefor Destroyed Goods. In Custom Controls Co. v. Rogers
Insurance22 a seller agreed to manufacture and sell twelve custom control
panels. After four panels were completed, but not yet delivered, they were
destroyed by fire without fault of either party. The seller sought recovery
from its insurer for the fair market value of the destroyed panels. The
insurer paid an amount to the seller based on the cost of remanufacturing
17. E.g., I F. ELLIOrr & M. RUUD, VERNON'S TEXAS CODE FORMS ANNOTATED
§ 1.208 (Forms I & 2) (1968).
18. Bodiford v. Parker, 651 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ);
Dhanani Invs., Inc. v. Second Master Bilt Homes, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1983, no writ); Highpoint of Montgomery Corp. v. Vail, 638 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
19. 653 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
20. 605 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
21. 653 S.W.2d at 942.
22. 652 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1983, no writ).
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the panels that was $158,000 less than the seller's fair market value claim.
In an action against the insurer, the seller contended that chapter 2 of the
Code did not apply to the issue of insurance coverage. The court held that
the definition of goods in section 2.10523 brought the insurance transaction
within the scope of chapter 2 for the purpose of determining coverage
under the insurance policy.24 The policy covered sold property on the
basis of the "[n]et selling price of the Assured. ' 25 The court examined
several provisions of chapter 2 to determine if title to the goods had
passed, or if either the buyer or seller had the right to seek specific per-
formance or bring an action for the price at the time the goods were de-
stroyed.26 The court concluded that the goods had not become sold goods
under chapter 2 for purposes of insurance coverage and that the insurer
was liable only for the cost of remanufacture, not for the fair market
value. 27 Although not mentioned by the court, section 2.509 dealing with
risk of loss supports the decision and provides a more direct route to the
same result.28
B. Enforceability of Sales Contracts
Statute of Frauds-Drafting a Valid Confirmation Between Merchants. Sec-
tion 2.201 of the Code contains the statute of frauds requirements for the
sale of goods.29 The basic rule provides that contracts for the sale of goods
for $500 or more are not enforceable unless evidenced by a writing signed
by the party against whom enforcement is sought.30 One of the exceptions
to this rule concerns confirmations between merchants. In section 2.201(b)
the Code makes certain sales contracts enforceable:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirma-
tion of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and
the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the
requirements of Subsection (a) against such party unless written no-
tice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is
received. 31
In Great Western Sugar Co. v. Lone Star Donut Co. 32 the seller sent a
letter agreement to the buyer that concluded, "This letter is a written con-
firmation of our agreement. Please sign and return to me the enclosed
23. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) defines
"goods" as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be
paid, investment securities (Chapter 8) and things in action."
24. 652 S.W.2d at 452.
25. Id at 453.
26. Id at 452-53. The court reviewed the rules of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
2.105-.106, .401, .709, .711, .717 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
27. 652 S.W.2d at 453.
28. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.509 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (risk of loss
in absence of breach).
29. Id § 2.201.
30. Id § 2.201(a).
31. Id § 2.201(b).
32. 567 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
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counterpart of this letter signalling your acceptance of the above agree-
ment. '33 The buyer never sent an objection to this letter agreement, nor
did he ever sign and return the counterpart. In ruling on the buyer's mo-
tion for summary judgment, the court reasoned that the letter agreement
was only an offer by the seller because the concluding paragraph specifi-
cally requested the signing and return of the counterpart as the method of
acceptance. 34 Because the counterpart was not signed and returned, the
court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the buyer. 35
Based on the decision in this case, the careful drafter, to avoid the con-
struction of a confirmation as an offer, should delete any language in the
confirmation that requires a buyer to perform some indicated act as an
expression of acceptance. 36
Unconscionability as a Claim. Under the Code unconscionability is an af-
firmative defense available to invalidate a contract in whole or in part.37
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (TDTPA),38 however, permits a
party to assert unconscionability as an affirmative claim for the recovery of
damages or injunctive relief.39 The Code and the TDTPA also differ on
the basic meaning of the term "unconscionability." Under the Code a con-
tract must be unconscionable, if at all, "at the time it was made."40 Under
the TDTPA a contract may be unconscionable at the time of formation or
during the course of performance. 41 North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. v.
Luna 42 nicely illustrates this difference in the meanings of unconscionabil-
ity. In North Star the purchaser bought a car under a warranty program
that permitted a dissatisfied purchaser to return a vehicle for a full refund
of the purchase price within thirty days after purchase or before the car
had been driven 1000 miles, whichever came first. Soon after the purchase
the buyer complained to the seller about mechanical defects, particularly
steering column vibration. The seller never corrected the steering column
defect.
33. Id. at 342.
34. Id. at 343.
35. Id at 345.
36. The most scrupulous drafting will not, of course, solve the cases in which parties
exchange forms that do not form a contract and yet, despite the mismatch, deal with each
other as if a contract existed. In such cases TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207(c) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968) recognizes a contract based upon the conduct of the parties. No stat-
ute of frauds problem exists because of the partial performance exception found in id
§ 2.20 1(c)(3).
37. Id § 2.302.
38. Id §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
39. Id. § 17.50(a)(3).
40. Id § 2.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
41. Id § 17.45(5) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides:
"Unconscionable action or course of action" means an act or practice which,
to a person's detriment:(A) takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or ca-
pacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree; or(B) results in gross disparity between the value received and consideration
paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration.
42. 653 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ requested).
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The buyer testified at trial that she made numerous requests for refund
prior to expiration of the warranty period, but was met with a variety of
excuses about why a refund could not be made (the contract was not yet
processed; the proper party was not available to make the refund; the vi-
bration would be corrected). The former service manager of the seller
testified that he knew that most cars of the particular model purchased by
the buyer had steering column vibration and acceded to the statement that
he would have a customer return repeatedly for service rather than ac-
knowledge the problem as irreparable. The court held that the buyer
presented sufficient evidence of an unconscionable act or course of action
to support a jury finding of unconscionability. 43
The buyer in North Star also asserted claims for deceptive acts or prac-
tices under the TDTPA "laundry list" 44 and for violation of the Texas
Consumer Credit Code (Motor Vehicle Installment Sales).4 5 The latter vi-
olation was posited on a clause in the sales contract that provided:
Seller [sic] his agents or representatives, may enter the premises where
the property may be and take immediate possession of the property
including any equipment or accessories, and Seller may take posses-
sion of any other items in the property at the time of the repossession,
and hold them without liability until demanded by Buyer .... 46
The court held that this clause violated article 5069-7.07(7) because the
clause did not require the seller to give notice regarding return of the
buyer's personal property not covered by a security interest at the time of
the repossession. 47 The court assessed a $2000 statutory penalty for this
43. Id. at 901.
44. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) contains a list of
several acts or practices that are declared to be deceptive. The buyer sought recovery under
id. § 17.46(b)(5), (7), (12), which provide:
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (d) of this section, the term "false, mis-
leading, or deceptive acts or practices" includes, but is not limited to, the fol-
lowing acts:
(5) representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, charac-
teristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or
that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection
which he does not;
(7) representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quali-
ty, or grade, or that the goods are of a particular style or model, and they are
of another;
(12) representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies,
or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by
law;
45. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts 5069-7.01 to .10 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
46. 653 S.W.2d at 900. The wording of this clause may be usefully compared to the
clause litigated in Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1981). In Zapata
a similar clause was held to violate TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(4) (Vernon
Supp. 1984). Zapata and similar cases are discussed in Krahmer, Commercial Transactions,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 201, 220 (1982).




violation,48 but denied a claim for the recovery of damages for mental
anguish because of a failure of proof.49
C Warranties
Deceptive Trade Practices and the Warranty of Title. Besides permitting
claims for deceptive trade practices and unconscionable acts or courses of
action, the TDTPA permits actions on breach of warranty claims.50 An
advantage to joining a TDTPA claim to a Code warranty claim is that the
Code only permits the recovery of actual damages,51 while the TDTPA
mandates the multiplication of actual damages52 and provides for the re-
covery of attorney's fees. 53 These features of the TDTPA provided the
plaintiff with a sizable recovery in Saenz Motors v. Big H Auto Auction,
Inc. 54 based on a breach of warranty of title for two automobiles
purchased from the defendant auction company. After the buyer
purchased the cars the Department of Public Safety seized the cars as sto-
len vehicles and never returned them. The court had no difficulty finding
a breach of the warranty of title under the Code,55 despite a complete lack
of proof that the cars actually were stolen.56 The court based its conclu-
sion on the official comments to section 2.312, which state that disturbance
of quiet possession is one way to show that the warranty of title has been
breached. 57 The seizure of the vehicles clearly disturbed the buyer's quiet
possession. Due to the breach of warranty, the plaintiff recovered both
treble damages and attorney's fees. 58
Express and Implied Warranties in Construction Contracts. Although the
Code limits warranties to transactions involving the sale of goods,59 the
Texas Supreme Court has developed a series of warranty standards in con-
48. 653 S.W.2d at 900.
49. Id. at 898.
50. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides that "[a]
consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a producing cause
of actual damages: .. .(2) breach of an express or implied warranty .
51. Id. § 2.714 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
52. Prior to 1979 the TDTPA provided for the trebling of actual damages, but in that
year it was amended to provide:
In a suit filed under this section, each consumer who prevails may obtain:
(1) the amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact. In addition
the court shall award two times that portion of the actual damages that does
not exceed $1,000. If the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant
was committed knowingly, the trier of fact may award not more than three
times the amount of actual damages in excess of $1,000.
Id. § 17.50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
53. Id. § 17.50(a).
54. 653 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
55. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
56. 653 S.W.2d at 525.
57. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312 comment I (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), pro-
vides: "Disturbance of quiet possession, although not mentioned specifically, is one way,
among many, in which the breach of the warranty of title may be established."
58. 653 S.W.2d at 525-26. Treble damages were awarded because the case arose prior
to the 1979 amendments to the TDTPA.
59. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides that
1984]
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struction cases that parallel the Code. 60 In Austin Co. v. Vaughn Building
Corp. 61 the court permitted recovery for breach of a one-year express war-
ranty covering the construction of a commercial building. The warranty
did not specify a time by which the owner was required to give notice of
defects. The court held that notice by the owner one year and eleven days
after final acceptance of the building was timely in the absence of any
showing of prejudice to the contractor and in light of the undisputed fact
that the defect existed when the building was completed. 62 The court,
however, specifically declined to address the question of whether a com-
mercial construction contract contains an implied warranty of fitness.63
In two other construction cases64 the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed
the rule that implied warranties of fitness do exist in the construction of
residential dwellings. 65 These cases differ, however, on the level of consis-
tency of underlying policy. In the last survey the author suggested that the
lower Texas courts had adopted a purely mechanical approach to the issue
of whether implied warranties exist in the sale of used goods or used
homes. 66 The author reasoned that "a better jurisprudential approach
would be to recognize that implied warranties can exist in such sales and
focus judicial consideration on whether particular defects should fall
within the scope of such an implied warranty. '67
In Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc. 68 the court adopted a rule extending the
implied warranty of habitability to the buyer of a used home for "latent
defects not discoverable by a reasonably prudent inspection of the building
at the time of sale."' 69 In support of the rule extending implied warranty
protection to the buyer of a used home, the court held:
As between the builder and owner, it matters not whether there has
been an intervening owner. The effect of the latent defect on the sub-
sequent owner is just as great as on the original buyer and the builder
is no more able to justify his improper work as to a subsequent owner
than to the original buyer. The public policy upon which the Humber
decision was based applies equally to both situations ...
• . . We hold that the implied warranty of habitability and good
workmanship is implicit in the contract between the builder/vendor
and original purchaser and is automatically assigned to the subse-
chapter 2 "applies to transactions in goods." "Goods" are defined in id. § 2.105(a) (quoted
supra note 23).
60. See Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978); Humber v. Morton, 426
S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
61. 643 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. 1983).
62. Id. at 115.
63. Id
64. Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983); G-W-L, Inc. v.
Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
65. See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968).
66. Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 145,
150-52 (1983).
67. Id. at 152.
68. 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983).




The court noted that the rule adopted in Gupta involved an implied war-
ranty running from the builder to a subsequent purchaser, but did not cre-
ate an implied warranty running from a nonbuilder owner to a
purchaser.7' The court also disapproved Thornton Homes, Inc. v. Grei-
ner, 72 which denied the existence of implied warranties from a builder in
the sale of a used home.73 The Gupta rule has the distinct benefit of con-
centrating judicial energy on the fact issues of when latent defects exist in
the sale of used homes, rather than on denying relief on a questionable
doctrinal basis.
In the other construction warranty case decided during the survey pe-
riod, G- W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux,74 the Texas Supreme Court considered the
question of whether the following clause in a promissory note was suffi-
cient to waive the implied warranty of habitability in the sale of a new
home:
This note, the aforesaid Mechanic's and Materialmen's Lien Contract
and the plans and specification signed for identification by the parties
hereto constitute the entire agreement between the parties hereto with
reference to the erection of said improvements, there being no oral
agreements, representations, conditions, warranties, express or im-
plied, in addition to said written instruments.75
The Beaumont court of appeals previously ruled that the clause was insuf-
ficient to operate as a waiver of the implied warranty of fitness because its
language was not "clear and free from doubt. '76 The Texas Supreme
Court agreed with this standard, but disagreed with the lower court's ap-
plication. 77 In reversing the court of appeals the Texas Supreme Court
held that the language used was fully adequate to disclaim the warranty of
fitness.78 In a vigorous dissent Justice Spears stated:
The warranty of habitability is implied in law to protect innocent con-
sumers, and to hold builders accountable for their work. To effectuate
the public policies underlying the implied warranty, a court should
not consider the warranty waived except by very express and specific
language which clearly reflects that the buyer knew the implied war-
ranty did not attach to the sale of his home. 79
This author agrees with the Spears dissent. It is anomalous for a court
to adopt a forward-looking approach to the creation of an implied war-
ranty of fitness in the sale of new and used homes closely paralleling the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 619 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
73. 646 S.W.2d at 169.
74. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982).
75. Id. at 393.
76. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 622 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1982).
77. 643 S.W.2d at 393.
78. Id.
79. 1d. at 395.
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implied warranties under the Code,80 and then adopt a standard for dis-
claimers that permits the warranty to be disclaimed in a manner that is
likely to go unnoticed by the parties it is designed to protect. As urged by
the buyer, applying the Code disclaimer standards by analogy is a better
means to insure that the implied warranty of fitness has real meaning."'
The court, however, sidestepped this issue and indicated that the Code
does not apply to the sale of homes.82 This determination is unpersuasive
because it does not respond to the question of whether the Code disclaimer
standards should apply to home sales. Interestingly enough, the court
noted that section 2.107 covers the sale of a structure to be removed from
realty.8 3 Given the large number of manufactured homes built in Texas,
the existence of separate disclaimer standards for site-built and manufac-
tured homes is even less appropriate. Since the court has recognized the
symmetry of policies underlying the need for warranties of quality in the
areas of goods and homes, it should recognize the same symmetry of poli-
cies underlying the need for clear, express, and conspicuous disclaimers in
both areas.
Warranties in the Sale of Goods. The Amarillo court of appeals applied the
Code's disclaimer standards in Balderson-Berger Equipment, Inc. v.
Blount. 84 In Blount the seller gave an express oral warranty, but the writ-
ten contract clearly and conspicuously disclaimed all warranties, express
and implied, other than the warranties contained in the written contract.
The buyer denied any knowledge of the disclaimers and testified that he
did not read the contract before signing it. The court held that the dis-
claimers met the requirements of the Code and that the buyer was there-
fore bound by them.8 5 The fact that the buyer signed the contract without
reading it did not constitute a valid defense to the effectiveness of the
disclaimers.86
D Bona Fide Purchase
Bona Fide Purchase from a Person with Voidable Title. Since the decision
in Samuels & Co. v. Mahon,87 section 2.403 of the Code has created
problems for cattle sellers. Under section 2.403 one who sells goods in
exchange for a check that is later dishonored loses the right to recover the
80. The Code warranties of quality appear in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314-
.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
81. The Code requires disclaimers to be not only clear and specific, but also to be con-
spicuous. Id § 2.316(b).
82. 643 S.W.2d at 394.
83. Id TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.107(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
"A contract for the sale of... a structure or its materials to be removed from realty is a
contract for the sale of goods .... "
84. 653 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
85. Id. at 908. The Code disclaimer standards are set out in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.316 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
86. 653 S.W.2d at 908.




goods from a bona fide purchaser from the original defaulting buyer. 88 An
unfortunately common situation for cattle sellers concerns delivery of cat-
tle to a broker in exchange for a rubber check. By the time the check
bounces, the broker has resold the cattle to a packing company. Unless the
cattle seller can show that the broker acted as an agent for the packing
company, thereby defeating bona fide purchaser status, the original buyer
loses the right to recover the cattle. In the latest of a series of cases involv-
ing Iowa Beef Processors and an insolvent cattle broker,89 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the cattle sellers failed to prove an agency rela-
tionship between the broker and Iowa Beef.90 Due to the failure of proof,
the cattle sellers could not recover against the processor, a bona fide
purchaser.91
Bona Fide Purchase of Automobiles. In stark contrast to the cases involv-
ing cattle or other ordinary goods, the purchaser of an automobile who
does not acquire the original certificate of title as part of the purchase may
be compelled to return the car to the true owner. 92 This result obtains
because the Certificate of Title Act requires a specified manner of transfer
for automobile titles. Unless the bona fide purchaser obtains a valid certif-
icate of title, the original owner is entitled to reclaim the vehicle.93 For
example, in Everett v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 94 the court allowed
the original owner to reclaim the vehicle even though a chain of subse-
quent purchasers had purchased the car under a certified copy of the certif-
icate of title. The court held that the certified copy conveyed no rights in
the car as against the holder of the original title.95
E Performance Disputes
The Perfect Tender Rule in the Sale of Goods. In contracts for the sale of
goods, the Code adopts the pre-Code "perfect tender" rule.96 Under this
rule a buyer is entitled to reject goods that do not conform to the contract
88. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
89. Rufenacht v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 656 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 921 (1982); Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d 250
(5th Cir. 1980); Valley View Cattle Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 548 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977).
90. Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (5th Cir.
1983). As in Rufenacht v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 656 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982), the plaintiff attempted to apply collateral estoppel to avoid
relitigating the agency issue. For the reasons discussed in Rufenacht, the court held that
collateral estoppel could not be used on the facts of this case. Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983). The collateral estoppel aspects of
Rufenacht are discussed in Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 191, 203 (1981).
91. Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1362 (5th Cir. 1983).
92. See, e.g., Drake Ins. Co. v. King, 606 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1980); Pfluger v. Colquitt,
620 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
93. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1984).
94. 653 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
95. Id. at 950-5 1.
96. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.601 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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no matter how slight the deviation.97 Also, when the goods comprise sev-
eral commercial units, the buyer may reject the defective units and accept
the rest. 98 In Texas Imports v. Allday9 9 the buyer rejected 22 of 49 cattle as
nonconforming under the sales contract. The buyer attempted to tender
payment for the 27 accepted cattle, but the seller rejected the tender. The
buyer then returned all 49 cattle to the seller under an agreement provid-
ing that both parties retained their legal rights as they existed at the time of
tender, pending the outcome of litigation. In a carefully reasoned opinion
the Tyler court of appeals discussed the application of the perfect tender
rule in sales cases and its relation to other Code provisions. The court
concluded that the buyer was entitled to reject the nonconforming cattle
and accept those that did conform.1°° The seller did not assert a right to
cure under section 2.508. The case is worth examination because it is the
first Texas decision discussing the operation of the Code provisions on
tender of goods, rather than erroneously using the general contract law of
substantial performance. 01
Revocation of Acceptance. While the Code adopts the perfect tender rule
as the operative standard for cases of initial tender, 0 2 other Code provi-
sions limit the apparent harshness of the rule in a variety of circum-
stances.' 0 3 One of these limitations, section 2.508, provides two distinct
rules granting the seller a right to cure defects in the tendered goods. First,
if the time for performance has not passed, the seller may seasonably no-
tify the buyer that the defects will be cured and may make a conforming
tender within the contract time.'°4 Second, if the time for performance has
passed and the buyer rejects a nonconforming tender that the seller reason-
ably believed would be acceptable, the seller may seasonably notify the
buyer and have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender.105 Operation of the perfect tender rule is also limited when the
buyer initially accepts the goods but later attempts to revoke the accept-
ance. In this circumstance section 2.608 prevents the buyer from revoking
acceptance unless the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the
goods. 10 6
In a case of first impression in Texas, Gappelburg v. Landrum,' °7 both
97. Id The seller is protected against surprise rejection by the right to cure granted in
id § 2.508.
98. Id § 2.601.
99. 649 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Id at 737-38.
101. Del Monte Corp. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no
writ), provides a good contrast to Texas Imports because it invokes the general contract rule
of substantial performance.
102. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.601 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
103. See, e.g., id §§ 2.508 (cure by seller of improper tender or delivery), 2.512 (payment
by buyer before inspection), 2.608 (revocation of acceptance in whole or in part).
104. Id § 2.508(a).
105. Id § 2.508(b).
106. Id. § 2.608(a).




the Dallas court of appeals and the Texas Supreme Court confronted the
issue of how the buyer's right to revocation and the seller's right to cure
should be read together when both rights arise out of the same transaction.
In this case the buyer purchased an expensive big screen television that
failed to work properly. The seller repaired some of the defects during the
next two weeks. Three weeks after the sale, the set stopped working com-
pletely and the buyer notified the seller of the problem. The seller's service
representative told the buyer that the set would have to be taken to the
repair shop, but no one came to pick it up despite several calls to the seller.
Within a few days the buyer asked for his money back and the seller re-
sponded with an offer of a replacement. The buyer maintained his posi-
tion that a replacement would not be acceptable, and sued to recover the
price paid for the television. Both parties agreed that the buyer properly
revoked acceptance of the set, thus squarely raising the issue of whether
the seller had a right to cure after a proper revocation.108
The court of appeals recognized the novelty of the issue and carefully
reviewed cases from other jurisdictions, as well as numerous secondary
authorities.109 The court reasoned that the right to cure by repair ended
when the buyer properly revoked acceptance under section 2.608.110 As to
whether a right to cure by replacement survived the revocation of accept-
ance, however, the court noted that an underlying policy of the Code en-
courages parties to work out their differences and to minimize losses
resulting from defective performance. I I The court viewed the right to cure
under section 2.508 as a means of avoiding injustice by reason of a surprise
rejection by the buyer. 1 2 The court concluded that a seller's right to cure
by replacement survived a buyer's revocation of acceptance after a se-
quence of unsuccessful repair attempts. 1 3 On appeal the Texas Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and held that a better policy view was
to terminate the right to cure after revocation of acceptance, whether the
proposed cure was by repair or by replacement.11 4 Despite their opposite
resolution of the narrow issue presented by the case, both of the Gap-
pelberg opinions are worth reading on the subjects of revocation of accept-
ance and the right to cure as a valuable review of the policy issues
underlying these important areas of commercial law.
Substituted Performance. One of chapter 2's most important functions is
108. Id at 551.
109. Id at 552-53. The authorities cited in the opinion are a good compendium on the
issues presented by the case.
110. Id. at 551-52; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968).
111. 654 S.W.2d at 552 (citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-2, at 299 n.23 (2d ed. 1980)).
112. 654 S.W.2d at 552 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.508 comment 2 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968)).
113. 654 S.W.2d at 552.
114. Gappelberg v. Landrum, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 260, 262 (Feb. 29, 1984).
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
filling gaps in sales contracts by statutorily providing omitted terms." 5
Because an underlying tenet of the Code is to permit freedom of contract
to significant degree,1 6 parties are generally free to contract as they wish
on subjects covered by the gap-filling provisions. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. v.
Freeport Chemical Co. 17 illustrates both the Code's gap-filling function
and the parties' freedom to contract. The parties in Jon-T agreed to buy
and sell chemicals under a contract containing a comprehensive force
majeure clause excusing the seller's performance on occurrence of various
contingencies. The contract also provided that all deliveries were to be
"by rail 'unless otherwise agreed.' "1118 Because of extreme weather condi-
tions during the winter of 1978-1979, the seller failed to deliver 598 short
tons of acid ordered by the buyer. In an action by the buyer for damages
for nondelivery, the court held that the parties agreed to make all deliv-
eries by rail unless they mutually agreed to some other method."19 The
seller's performance was therefore excused under the contract's force
majeure clause because of the adverse weather conditions. 20 The buyer
argued that section 2.614 of the Code established a gap-filling rule that
required the seller to make deliveries by alternate means such as by
truck.12 Although the Code does provide this rule, the court held that the
parties' agreement superseded section 2.614 and that the seller was re-
quired only to make delivery as specified in the contract.' 22
F Remedies
Cost of Cover as General Damages. One of the Code's innovations is its
establishment of certain damage rules providing both sellers and buyers
with an efficient means of fixing damages while simultaneously minimiz-
ing losses caused by a default. 123 Of these rules, the most notable is section
2.712, which creates the buyer's right to cover.' 24 Under section 2.712, an
aggrieved buyer may cover by purchasing goods in substitution for those
originally due from the defaulting seller.' 25 The substitute purchase, how-
ever, must be made in good faith, without unreasonable delay, and on rea-
sonable terms. 126  Once the purchase is properly made, the buyer's
damages are calculated as the difference between the cost of cover and the
contract price, plus any incidental or consequential damages caused by the
115. This function of the Code, along with numerous examples, is discussed at length in
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1i1, § 3-4 to -9.
116. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
117. 704 F.2d 1412 (5th Cir. 1983).
118. Id. at 1415 (emphasis in original).
119. Id at 1415-17.
120. Id.
121. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.614 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
122. 704 F.2d at 1416-17.
123. The seller is provided with the remedy of resale under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.706 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), while the buyer is entitled to cover by obtaining
substitute goods under id § 2.712.
124. Id.




seller's breach. 127 A distinct advantage of the cover remedy is its avoid-
ance of the cumbersome process of proving market value at the time of
breach. 128
In Hess Die Mold, Inc. v. American Plasti-Plate Corp. 129 a manufacturer
of die molds failed to manufacture and deliver a mold within the time
specified by the sales contract. When it became apparent that the seller
would be unable to supply the mold, the buyer entered into a contract with
another manufacturer to obtain a substitute mold costing $24,000 more
than that originally contracted for. In the buyer's action to recover its
down payment and the cost of cover, the seller contended that the cover
damages were special damages not contemplated by the parties at the time
the contract was signed and therefore not recoverable. The court reviewed
the Code provisions on cover damages 30 and on consequential dam-
ages 13' and concluded that cover damages constituted an item of general
damages recoverable from any defaulting seller regardless of whether they
were contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was signed. 132
Statute of Limitations in Sales Cases. An earlier survey noted that Garcia v.
Texas Instruments, Inc. 133 introduced a serious element of confusion into
the question of when the four-year statute of limitations begins to run in
claims for personal injuries based on a breach of warranty under the
Code.' 34 In Garcia the Texas Supreme Court clearly held that implied
warranty actions for personal injuries are within the section 2.725 four-
year statute of limitations rather than the two-year general tort statute of
limitations. 135 In its opinion, however, the court referred to two different
starting points for the statute of limitations, the date of the accident 36 and
the date of sale.' 37 Nowhere in the opinion did the court clarify which
date applies.
This confusion already has caused one possibly erroneous decision 138
and now has led to a second decision, Garvie v. Duo-Fast Corp. ,39 that
may also be incorrect. In Garvie, however, the Fifth Circuit faced the ad-
ditional problem of dealing with its own federal precedent 40 as well as
127. Id. § 2.712(b).
128. The Code rules on proof of market value and admissibility of market quotations
give some idea of the difficulties of proof involved in this issue. See id. §§ 2.723-.724.
129. 653 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
130. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.712 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
131. Id. § 2.715.
132. 653 S.W.2d at 929-30.
133. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).
134. Krahmer, supra note 46, at 208-09; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968).
135. 610 S.W.2d at 458-63; see TEX. REV. Cwy. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(4) (Vernon Supp.
1984).
136. 610 S.W.2d at 457.
137. Id. at 465.
138. Cleveland v. Square-D Co., 613 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, no writ).
139. 711 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1983).
140. Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Garcia, the applicable Texas law. Because of Garcia's lack of clarity, the
court considered itself bound by federal precedent, which recognizes the
date of sale as triggering the statute of limitations. 14' While this decision is
a practical response to the Garcia problem, a state court clarification of
Garcia would be desirable.' 42
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Form of Negotiable Instruments
Time of Maturity. One important distinction between demand instruments
and time instruments concerns the accrual date of a cause of action. Sec-
tion 3.122 of the Code provides: "(a) A cause of action against a maker
or an acceptor accrues (1) in the case of a time instrument on the day after
maturity; (2) in the case of a demand instrument upon its date or, if no
date is stated, on the date of issue." 143 In Loomis v. Republic National
Bank 144 a debtor executed a note payable "on demand or if no demand is
made 1-31-77." 145 The holder of the note filed suit more than four years
after the note was issued, but less than four years after January 31, 1977.
Whether the suit was within the limitation period depended entirely on
classification of the note as a demand instrument or a time instrument. 146
The court found no Texas authority or Code provision dealing with this
issue. The court did find a pre-Code Oklahoma case that discussed the
precise problem.147 The Loomis court adopted the Oklahoma court's ra-
tionale, which construed the note as a time instrument. 48 The cause of
141. 711 F.2d at 48.
142. A judicial clarification must, of course, work within the confines of existing legisla-
tion. Based solely on the ordinary methods of statutory interpretation, the reading of TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) by the federal court in Clark v.
DeLaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1324-25 (5th Cir. 1981), is sound: cause of action
based on breach of implied warranty accrues when tender of delivery is made because an
implied warranty by its very nature does not extend to the future performance of the goods.
Unless a court is willing to hold that implied warranty actions for personal injuries somehow
extend to future performance, but other implied warranties do not (a distinction of dubious
theoretical merit, although probably responsive to a felt need), a legislative clarification may
be desirable. In a concurring opinion in Garvie, Judge Rubin stated, "Although I was a
member of the panel that decided Clark, I write separately to state that, on further reflection,
the result in that case seems unjust: a plaintiff's cause of action may have accrued and been
extinguished before the plaintiff is injured." 711 F.2d at 49. Judge Rubin's statement may
point up a need for reevaluating the function of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968) as a commercial statute of limitations in contrast to its developing use
as a de facto tort statute of limitations in cases of personal injury or property damage. One
must remember that this provision of the Code antedates the development of strict liability
in tort as a separate cause of action and that the way of viewing injury and property claims
in tort is vastly different today than when the Code was written. As needs change, statutes
should be revised.
143. Id. § 3.122(a).
144. 653 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
145. Id. at 77.
146. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5527(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (four-year statute of
limitations for promissory notes).
147. First Nat'l Bank v. Bell, 140 Okla. 24, 282 P. 147 (1929).
148. 653 S.W.2d at 78.
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action, therefore, could be maintained. 149
B. Enforcement of Commercial Paper
Rights AcquiredAbsent Due Negotiation. If an instrument is transferred for
value, the transferee acquires the specifically enforceable right to have the
transferor's unqualified indorsement. 50 Until the indorsement is made,
however, the transferee does not qualify as a holder because the instru-
ment has not been duly negotiated, and no presumption exists that the
transferee is the owner of the instrument.' 5' A transferee who takes an
instrument without simultaneously obtaining a proper indorsement runs
the risk of having to prove proper ownership, instead of avoiding the issue
by raising a presumption of ownership on a motion for summary
judgment.
This precise situation occurred in First State Bank v. Hughes. 152 The
payor bank, as successor to the rights of the transferee, learned that its
failure to return the instrument for lack of a proper indorsement, and the
falure of the transferee to obtain such an indorsement, forced a full trial on
the merits to prove the issues surrounding the instrument's transfer. 153
The case would not have arisen if the instrument had been properly in-
dorsed. Needless to say, the lesson was a time consuming and expensive
one. Payor banks should examine instruments presented for payment with
greater care.
Rights Acquired When Instrument Is Duly Negotiated When a transferee
acquires an instrument by due negotiation, the transferee qualifies as a
holder and is entitled to recover on the instrument, unless the effectiveness
of a necessary signature is put in issue or the defendant establishes a de-
fense. Is4 In many instances the mere production of an instrument that is
duly issued or negotiated to the holder is a sufficient basis for recovery on
a motion for summary judgment.' 55 In Zarges v. Bevan 156 the Texas
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that a photocopied instrument,
sworn to be true and correct, is proper evidence to support a summary
judgment. In cases involving the production of photocopies, however, a
court may require security indemnifying the defendant against loss due to
later claims made on the instrument. 157
149. Id
150. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
151. Id.
152. 654 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
153. Id. at 32-33.
154. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
155. See, e.g., Zarges v. Bevan, 652 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1983); Jackson T. Fulgham Co. v.
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 649 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tyra v.
Dowell, 644 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
156. 652 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1983) (reaffirming Life Ins. Co. v. Gar-Del, Inc., 570 S.W.2d
378 (Tex. 1978)).
157. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.804 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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C Defenses to Enforcement of Commercial Paper
Garnishment as a Defense. If a holder acquires an instrument for value, in
good faith, and without notice that it is overdue or of any defense against
it, the holder qualifies as a holder in due course. 5 8 The holder in due
course takes the instrument free of many possible defenses assertable
against the assignee of a simple contract. 159 William v. Stansbury 60 illus-
trates the high degree of protection accorded to a holder in due course. In
Williams a holder purchased an instrument without knowledge of the in-
strument's prior subjection to garnishment proceedings. The jury found
that the holder was unaware that the note was in default or subject to
garnishment proceedings at the time of purchase. The Texas Supreme
Court properly held that the holder in due course took the note free of any
defenses or claims arising from the garnishment proceedings.' 6' The court
would have reached the opposite result if a simple debt had been involved,
or if the party had not been a holder in due course. 162
IV. BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. Bank Deposits
Limitations on Right of Set-Off United States courts have adopted two
distinct rules governing a bank's right to set-off the account of a depositor
against debts owed to the bank. The first rule permits set-off unless the
bank has actual or constructive notice that the account is held by the de-
positor in trust for another. 163 The second rule prohibits set-off when the
bank has actual or constructive notice that the depositor is holding funds
in trust, but also requires the bank to show a detrimental change of posi-
tion in reliance on the set-off to avoid liability to the equitable owner even
if the bank has no initial knowledge of the trust. 164
Texas follows the latter rule, referred to. as the equitable set-off or fed-
eral set-off rule.165 Two cases reported during the survey period applied
158. Id § 3.302.
159. Compare id § 3.305 (rights of a holder in due course) with id. § 3.306 (rights of one
not a holder in due course).
160. 649 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1983).
161. Id at 296.
162. Id at 296 n.2.
163. See, e.g., Keeney v. Bank of Italy, 33 Cal. App. 515, 165 P. 735 (1917); Clemmer v.
Drover's Nat'l Bank, 157 Ill. 206, 41 N.E. 728 (1895); First Nat'l Bank v. Eastern Trust &
Banking Co., 108 Me. 79, 79 A. 4 (1911); Wagner v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 122 Tenn.
164, 122 S.W. 245 (1909).
164. The following states have adopted the equitable set-off rule: Colorado, Indiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin. See Cox v. Metropolitan State Bank, Inc., 138 Colo. 576, 336 P.2d 742
(1959); Peoples State Bank v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 213 Ind. 235, 12 N.E.2d 123 (1938);
Burtnett v. First Nat'l Bank, 38 Mich. 630 (1878); Berg v. Union State Bank, 186 Minn. 529,
243 N.W. 696 (1932); Allen Dudley & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Neb. 443, 240 N.W. 522
(1932); Brady v. American Nat'l Bank, 120 Okla. 162, 250 P. 1006 (1926); Sherts v. Fulton
Nat'l Bank, 342 Pa. 337, 21 A.2d 18 (1941); Peurifoy v. Boswell, 162 S.C. 107, 160 S.E. 156
(1931); Thompson v. Commercial & Sav. Bank, 50 S.D. 154, 208 N.W. 780 (1926); Commer-
cial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33 (1974).
165. The Texas Supreme Court adopted this rule in National Indem. Co. v. Spring
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the first portion of the equitable rule. 166 In each case the set-off was disal-
lowed when the depositor demonstrated that the bank had notice that the
funds were held in trust for another. 167
B. Bank Collections
TimeAiowedfor Paying Documentary Drafts. The midnight deadline ap-
plicable to the handling of checks and other demand items by a payor
bank 168 does not cover the handling of documentary drafts.169 With docu-
mentary drafts a payor bank is required to follow the instructions of its
transferor regarding the time allowed for acceptance or payment. A fail-
ure to follow instructions may result in liability for the payor bank. 170 If a
documentary draft is "payable at" a named bank, the Code makes the
named bank a payor bank for purposes of determining its rights and re-
sponsibilities concerning the draft and accompanying documents.17' In
Hamby Co. v. Seminole State Bank 172 the Texas Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court decision, which held that two drafts designated as pay-
able at the Seminole bank made that bank a mere collecting bank respon-
sible only for making seasonable collection of the drafts. 173 Instead, the
supreme court ruled that the Seminole bank was a payor bank and thus
required to follow the instructions of its transferor concerning the time for
payment or, failing payment, the time for returning the draft. 174 The
transferor presented the drafts and accompanying invoices to the bank on
April 4, 1980, and instructed the bank not to hold the drafts after the ma-
turity date of April 10, 1980, unless otherwise instructed. On April 14,
1980, the transferor inquired into the status of the drafts. The bank, hav-
ing not yet paid the drafts, returned them the same day. The supreme
court concluded that the payor bank became accountable for the drafts
under section 4.302 of the Code by failing to dishonor and return the drafts
on April 10, 1980, in accordance with the instructions. 75
Branch State Bank, 162 Tex. 521, 348 S.W.2d 528 (1961), and has been followed in Texas
since that time. See, e.g., Continental Nat'l Bank v. Great Am. Management & Inv., Inc.,
606 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.); First Nat'l Bank v.
Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 524 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.).
166. Reed v. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Co., 655 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1983, writ ref d n.r.e.); Collin County Sav. & Loan v. Miller Lumber Co., 653 S.W.2d 114
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
167. Reed v. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Co., 655 S.W.2d 259, 261-64 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Collin County Sav. & Loan v. Miller Lumber Co., 653 S.W.2d
114, 117 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
168. The midnight deadline is midnight of the next banking day following the day of
receipt of an item or other relevant notice. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.104(a)(8)
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
169. Id. § 4.301.
170. Id § 4.302.
171. Id. § 3.121.
172. 652 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1983).
173. Hamby Co. v. Seminole State Bank, 649 S.W.2d 81, 82-83 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1982). The seasonable time standard for collecting banks appears in TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 4.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
174. 652 S.W.2d at 941.
175. Id. at 941; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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C Letters of Credit
Limits on the Use of a Letter of Credit. The letter of credit is an extremely
versatile, widely accepted financing device 176 because it amounts to an al-
most iron-clad guarantee to pay the letter's beneficiary. 177 By comparison,
a negotiable instrument is an I.O.U. written on the back of a matchbook.
Despite its security, the letter of credit is still not acceptable for some pur-
poses, as demonstrated in Heritage Housing Corp. v. Ferguson. 178 In Heri-
tage the appellant sought leave to file a letter of credit in lieu of the surety
bond required under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c). 17 9 The court
denied the motion and properly held that a letter of credit is not a negotia-
ble instrument and therefore does not qualify as a proper form of bond
under rule 14(c). 180 As a practical matter, a letter of credit is as secure as
the negotiable bank obligations required by rule 14(c). The rule could be
appropriately amended to include letters of credit as an approved form of
surety bond.
V. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
A. Enforcement of Securities Contracts
Statute of Frauds. Section 8.319 of the Code contains a statute of frauds
provision that requires enforceable contracts for the sale of securities to be
in writing unless one of the limited exceptions is met.' 8 ' In Consolidated
Petroleum Industries, Inc. v. Jacobs ' 82 the Eastland court of appeals held
that an oral contract to sell securities was not enforceable because no writ-
ten agreement existed and none of the statutory exceptions applied. 83 The
plaintiff urged, however, that the common law doctrine of promissory es-
toppel created an additional exception to section 8.319. The court agreed
that promissory estoppel is available as a statute of frauds exception in
securities cases, but ruled that promissory estoppel did not apply in this
case because the plaintiff presented no proof that the defendants orally
176. See, e.g., East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598
(5th Cir. 1979) (letter of credit used to guarantee credit of contractor on construction pro-
ject); Cypress Bank v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 610 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (standby letter of credit used to guarantee payment of
telephone charges); Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., 583 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, no writ) (letter of credit used in sale of goods transaction).
177. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
178. 651 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
179. TEX. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
180. 651 S.W.2d at 273.
181. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
182. 648 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, no writ).
183. Id at 366. Under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968) the statutory exceptions are: (I) that there be some writing signed by the party to be
charged showing the quantity and price of the securities involved in the contract, id
§ 8.319(1); (2) that delivery or payment is made, id § 8.319(2); (3) that the party to be
charged receives a written confirmation of the oral agreement and makes no objection
within 10 days after receipt, id. § 8.319(3); and (4) that the party against whom enforcement




promised to sign a written contract.' 8 4
In Mortgageamerica Corp. v. American National Bank 185 the plaintiff
successfully met one of the section 8.319 exceptions by showing that the
defendant received written confirmations of the contracted sale without
objection, thereby making the contract enforceable even without a written
agreement. 186 Although the defendant did not receive the confirmations
until three months after the oral agreement, the defendant failed to request
a special issue at trial on whether this delay was reasonable. 87 The court
held that the defendant's failure precluded raising the issue on appeal. 188
B. Shareholder's Rights Against Issuer
Replacement of Lost Shares. In a case of first impression the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Glaser v. Texon Energy Corp. ' 89 held that a share-
holder is precluded from compelling an issuer to replace lost share certifi-
cates if the shareholder fails to provide reasonable information to the
issuer about the lost shares pursuant to the issuer's request under section
8.405 of the Code. 190 In Glaser the issuer requested the shareholder to
provide a variety of information about the lost shares, apparently because
the stock transfer records showed that all shares owned by the shareholder
had been cancelled several years before. The shareholder never responded
to this request and eventually filed suit to compel the issuance of replace-
ment shares. The shareholder claimed an inability to meet the issuer's re-
quest for the numbers of the lost certificates. The court, however, noted
that the issuer had a legitimate need for this information to avoid overissue
under the Texas Business Corporation Act.191 Furthermore, the court rec-
ognized a need to identify the lost shares if the shares should ever be
presented to the issuer for transfer. 92
184. 648 S.W.2d at 367. As adopted in Texas, the promissory estoppel exception to the
statute of frauds requires the party against whom enforcement is sought to have explicitly
promised to sign and deliver a written contract meeting the requirements of the statute of
frauds. See, e.g., Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1982); "Moore" Burger, Inc. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1972).
185. 651 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
186. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
187. See id
188. 651 S.W.2d at 856-57.
189. 702 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1983).
190. Id. at 572. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.405(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)
(amended 1983) provided:
(b) Where the owner of a security claims that the security has been lost, de-
stroyed or wrongfully taken, the issuer must issue a new security in place of
the original security if the owner
(1) so requests before the issuer has notice that the security has been ac-
quired by a bona fide purchaser; and
(2) files with the issuer a sufficient indemnity bond; and
(3) satisfies any other reasonable requirements imposed by the issuer.
This section has been amended since the decision in Glaser, but the revision has no effect on
the validity of the case. See id. § 8.405(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
191. 702 F.2d at 572; see TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.12-.16 (Vernon 1980).
192. 702 F.2d at 572.
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C. Legislative Changes
The New Chapter 8. The 68th Legislature adopted a completely revised
chapter 8 for the Business and Commerce Code. 193 A comprehensive re-
view of the new chapter 8 is beyond the scope of this Article, but four main
areas of the revision deserve particular mention. 94
First, the revision creates a new form of corporate share ownership, the
uncertificated security.' 95 This new form of security necessitated the con-
forming changes in chapter 1 of the Code that were described earlier in the
discussion of chapter 1. '96
Second, because the uncertificated security does not have a tangible
existence, no share certificate can be seized by attachment or levy. A judg-
ment creditor can reach uncertificated securities registered in the name of a
judgment debtor only by legal process at the issuer's chief executive office
in the United States.' 97 Both the new and the old chapter 8 specifically
provide that a creditor attempting to levy on securities is entitled to the aid
of a court of appropriate jurisdiction in reaching the securities.' 9 8
Third, the creation of a security interest in investment securities will be
governed by section 8.321 instead of section 9.203, whether or not the
shares are certificated. 199 If a lender has established procedures for acquir-
ing a security interest in shares of stock, these procedures do not have to be
changed because the substance of section 8.321 is identical to the former
section 9.203.200 The new chapter 8 does not compel the issuance of uncer-
tificated securities. An issuer is free to choose whether a particular issue
will be entirely certificated, uncertificated, or a mixture of both. 20' If the
latter choice is made, the holder is entitled to exchange a certificated secur-
ity for one that is uncertificated or vice versa. 20 2 A secured lender who
prefers not to deal with uncertificated shares, therefore, is entitled to have
certificated shares issued in the name of the lender, unless the particular
stock issue is completely uncertificated. 20 3
A secured loan against uncertificated securities is made and simultane-
193. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 442, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2511-83 (codified at TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.101-.408 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
194. For those interested in a comprehensive discussion of the new chapter 8 and its
effect on Texas law, see Special Project, Uncertfifcated Securities, Articles 8 and 9 of the
U. CC, and the Texas Business Corporation Act. A New System to Accommodate Modern
Securities Transactions, I1 TEx. TECH L. REV. 813 (1980). The article includes the full text
of the article 8 revision. A limited number of reprints of the article are available and, within
the limits of availability, the author of this Survey Article will be happy to supply copies
upon request.
195. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
196. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
197. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.317(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
198. Id § 8.317(0.
199. Id § 8.321.
200. Compare id (enforceability, attachment, perfection, and termination of security in-
terests) with id § 9.203 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (amended 1983) (attachment and enforce-
ability of security interests).





ously perfected by registration of the pledge on the books of the issuer or
transfer agent.20 4 If the debtor signs a written security agreement describ-
ing the security, the security interest arises and is perfected at the time the
secured party gives new value. 20 5 This security interest becomes un-
perfected, however, after twenty-one days unless perfected by transfer
within that time. 20 6 An advantage to lending on uncertificated securities is
that the security is not subject to loss or theft and the secured party is
insulated from liability for such loss under the duty of care rules stated in
section 9.207.207
Fourth, under the new chapter 8, a second secured party can obtain a
perfected security interest in shares merely by notifying the first secured
party of the creation of the second security interest. 20 8 Perfection by notice
is available for either a certificated or an uncertificated security.20 9 This
change corrects a problem that existed under the former version of section
9.305, which required an acknowledgment from the first secured party that
he was willing to act as bailee for the benefit of the second secured
party.210
VI. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Creation of Security Interests
Classification of Collateral The primary purpose of collateral classification
under chapter 9 is to determine the proper method of perfection and, when
a filing is necessary, where the filing should be made.21' In one instance,
however, collateral classification is especially important because it may act
as a direct limitation on the validity of a security interest, rather than
merely as a means to perfect the security interest. For example, section
9.204 provides that no security interest attaches to consumer goods under
an after-acquired property clause if the goods are acquired more than ten
days after the secured creditor gives value under the security agreement.212
In Citizens National Bank v. Baggery 213 a creditor attempted to fore-
close on a security interest claimed under an after-acquired property
clause in two automobiles owned by the debtor. The debtor defended on
204. Id § 8.313(a)(2).
205. Id. § 8.313(a)(9).
206. Id § 8.321(b). Section 8.321(b) is the new chapter 8 equivalent of the old rule in
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.304(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (amended
1983) that permitted automatic perfection in an instrument, including share certificates, for a
period of 21 days from the time new value was given under a written security agreement.
ection 9.304 was amended to allow automatic perfection of certificated securities only
under section 8.321. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 443, § 19, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2511, 2580-81.
207. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
208. Id. § 8.313(a)(8).
209. Id
210. See I F. ELLIOTT & M. RUUD, supra note 17, § 9.305 (Supp. 1983).
211. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.302, .401-.402 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1984).
212. Id. § 9.204(b).
213. 649 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
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the ground that the cars were consumer goods214 and therefore were pro-
tected from foreclosure under section 9.204.215 The Austin court of ap-
peals held that the use to which the cars were put was a material issue of
fact that was not litigated at trial.216 The court remanded the case to deter-
mine if the cars were used primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes or in a manner that classified the goods as equipment217 or inven-
tory.218 In reaching this decision, the court stated, "In making such proof,
'the principle use to which the property is put should be considered as
determinative' in establishing whether the property is 'consumer goods,'
'equipment,' 'farm products,' or 'inventory.' ",219 Section 9.109 classifies
goods as consumer goods or equipment if they are "used or bought for
use" as consumer goods or equipment. 220 One problem with the court's
decision is its failure to discuss the possibility that the cars were bought for
use as consumer goods or equipment and later converted to another classi-
fication. This problem of the collateral's transmutation is difficult and de-
serves more consideration than it received in Baggerly. 221
B. Priorities in Secured Collateral
Buyers of Livestock. While a buyer in the ordinary course of business nor-
mally takes free of a security interest created by the seller, a person buying
farm products from one engaged in farming operations remains subject to
claims asserted by the seller's secured creditors. 222 In Cox v.
Bancoklahoma Agri-service Corp. 223 a buyer purchased cattle from a per-
son claiming to be a cattle trader. After the purchase, the seller's secured
creditor sued the buyer for conversion of the cattle. The buyer raised two
primary defensive issues: first, that he had purchased the cattle from a
cattle trader and not from someone engaged in farming operations; and
second, that the bank had waived its security interest in the cattle by per-
mitting the debtor to sell cattle on prior occasions without the written con-
214. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
215. Id § 9.204(b). Section 9.109(a) defines goods as consumer goods if "they are used
or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes ..... Id.
§ 9.109(a).
216. 649 S.W.2d at 813-14.
217. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984) defines
goods as equipment if "they are used or bought for use primarily in business ...."
218. Id § 9.109(d) defines goods as inventory if "they are held by a person who holds
them for sale or lease ...."
219. 649 S.W.2d at 814 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109 comment 2 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
220. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(a)-(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
221. Transmutation of collateral is discussed at some length in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 111, § 23-13. Although the collateral involved in Baggerly was automobiles, the
Certificate of Title Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Vernon 1977), was not in
issue because no third-party claimants contested the validity of the security interest's perfec-
tion. As between a secured creditor and a debtor, a security interest is effective without
perfection. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.201 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
222. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.307(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
223. 641 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
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sent of the bank, despite language in the security agreement requiring such
written consent.
On the first issue, the Amarillo court of appeals held that the buyer
failed to establish that the seller was not engaged in farming operations.
224
On the second issue, the court ruled that the buyer failed to show his reli-
ance on the bank's prior conduct permitting the sale of cattle without writ-
ten consent.225 Absent such a showing, the buyer was not entitled to a
favorable ruling on the waiver issue.226
C Proceedings After Default
Improper Repossession as Conversion. In two cases reported during the sur-
vey period a debtor alleged that a secured creditor converted the debtor's
property while repossessing collateral after a default. In Dolenz v. National
Bank 227 a bank repossessed three large trailers. The bank was unaware
that one of the trailers contained restaurant equipment. Several weeks
passed before the bank was able to determine the ownership of the equip-
ment. After learning that the equipment was probably owned by the
debtor, the bank offered to return the property upon proof of ownership.
The debtor never responded to the bank's offer, but later filed a conversion
action. The court noted that conversion requires the intentional repudia-
tion of an owner's right to the property and held that the bank took the
restaurant equipment without knowledge or intent to exercise dominion or
control over the property. 228 Furthermore, the bank offered to return the
property upon locating the apparent owner. 229 The judgment of the trial
court ruling in favor of the bank as a matter of law was affirmed.
230
In First National Bank v. Brown 231 a bank erroneously failed to list one
of the two cars owned by the debtor as collateral on the security agree-
ment. When the debtor defaulted, both cars were repossessed. In a subse-
quent action by the debtor for conversion of the car not covered by the
security agreement, the court held that a conversion had occurred because
the bank failed to refer to the security agreement before the reposses-
sion.232 Since the bank had the means of knowing that the repossession of
both cars was improper under the security agreement, the court upheld a
jury finding of willful and malicious conversion and an award of punitive
damages. 233
224. Id at 403.
225. Id at 404.
226. Id.
227. 649 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
228. Id. at 370.
229. Id.
230. Id
231. 644 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
232. Id. at 810.
233. Id. at 810-11.
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D. Legislative Changes
Certificates of Title. The last legislature amended section 9.302 of the Code
to include an accurate list of cross references to other certificate of title
legislation that controls the perfection of security interests in various items
of collateral. 234 The legislature also amended the Parks and Wildlife Code
to clarify the fact that chapter 9 of the Business and Commerce Code gov-
erns the resolution of priority disputes involving motorboats and outboard
motors. 235
Security Interests in Oil and Gas. The legislature added a new section
9.319, dealing with security interests in oil and gas, to chapter 9 of the
Code.236 This new section protects persons owning an entire or fractional
interest in oil and gas production and persons who have a right to receive
payments based on production. These persons are provided with a secur-
ity interest in the production to secure payment of the purchase price by
the first purchaser. 237 The security interest is perfected automatically and
continues as a perfected security interest without a time limit, the signing
of a security agreement, or the filing of a financing statement.238 The first
purchaser's sale of oil or gas production to a buyer in the ordinary course
of business cuts off the security interest in the oil and gas sold. The secur-
ity interest continues, however, in the sales proceeds received by the first
purchaser. 239
Section 9.319 contains its own set of priority rules, which give security
interests created by the section a special priority status over other security
interests. 240 The section also provides special rules concerning statutory
liens and tax liens.24' No portion of the section, however, correlates its
provisions with other Code sections that deal with security interests in oil
and gas.24 2
Section 9.319 in its present form is an unfortunate addition to the Code
234. Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 290, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1530. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ArN. § 9.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984) now provides:
(c)The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this Chapter is not
necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to
(2) the following statutes of this state; the Certificate of Title Act, as
amended (Article 6687-1, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes); Subchapter B-l,
Chapter 31, Parks and Wildlife Code, as amended, relating to the certificates
of title for motorboat and outboard motors; the Texas Manufactured Housing
Standards Act, as amended (Article 5221(f), Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes)
235. Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 636, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4062 (amending TEX. PARKS &
WILD. CODE ANN. §§ 31.052-.055).
236. Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 807, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4657-65 (codified at TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
237. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
238. Id § 9.319(a)-(b).
239. Id § 9.319(c), (e), (m).
240. Id § 9.319(f)-(i).
241. Id § 9.319(d), (f)-(h).
242. See, e.g., id §§ 9.103,.401-.403.
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because the section creates secret liens on oil and gas production. The
entire concept of notice filing assures a simplified and readily accessible
public record that reveals any security interests filed against a particular
debtor. Section 9.319 will increase the cost of financing oil and gas pro-
duction purchases by making the financing transactions bear the cost of a
real estate title search, instead of a much less expensive financing state-
ment records inquiry.243 At a minimum, the section should be amended to
simplify the search procedure.
Filing and Search Fee Amendments. The legislature increased the fee for
filing financing statements, termination statements, and release of collat-
eral statements in the standard form prescribed by the secretary of state
from three dollars to five dollars. 244 The charge for filings in nonstandard
form was increased to fifteen dollars from six dollars. 245 The basic search
fee remains ten dollars, unless a search certificate issued by a county filing
officer contains listings for more than ten financing statements. An addi-
tional fifty cents will be charged for each listing over ten. 246 A county
filing officer is required only to provide information about financing state-
ment filings and not information from the real estate records of the
county. 247
VII. CONTRACTS OF GUARANTY
Corporate Loan Not Usurious to Guarantors. In ReoublicBank Dallas v.
Shook 248 the Texas Supreme Court held that an individual guarantor
could not recover on a claim for usury regarding a loan made to a corpora-
tion owned by the guarantor, even though the corporation was established
at the request of the lender for the sole purpose of permitting a loan at the
higher corporate rate. 249 After a lengthy review of cases in both Texas and
other jurisdictions, the court aligned itself with the majority view. This
view holds that corporate loans are not usurious unless the loan is actually
made for a personal, family, or household purpose, rather than for a busi-
ness or commercial purpose.250 The court found that the present loan was
made to further a business enterprise and, therefore, was not usurious. 251
In Stanley v. Conner Construction Co. 252 the El Paso court of appeals
reached a similar result, holding that a corporate loan guarantor could not
assert a usury claim in regard to a loan made to the corporation.2 53 A
243. A Code financing statement search costs $10. Few lawyers are willing to search a
real estate title for that price. See id. § 9.407.
244. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 69, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 310.
245. Id
246. Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 562, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3253.
247. Id.
248. 653 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1983).
249. Id at 279-82.
250. Id. at 281.
251. Id. at 282.
252. 651 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
253. Id. at 38-39.
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major issue in Stanley was whether the person asserting the usury claim
was actually a principal obligor on the instrument or a guarantor. The
court admitted parol evidence to show the intent of the parties and con-
cluded that the individual should be classified as a guarantor.254 The court
also held that whether the individual was technically termed an accommo-
dation party, a guarantor of payment, or a guarantor of collection did not
affect the person's inability to assert a usury claim. 255
Consideration for Contract of Guaranty. In Reed v. First National Bank 256
the court held that independent consideration was not necessary to bind a
guarantor. 257 A loan made to the principal was sufficient consideration to
create a valid contract of guaranty. 258
254. Id
255. Id. at 39.
256. 645 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
257. Id. at 845.
258. Id..
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